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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Antitrust-Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Effects Doctrine-A
Conflicts Approach.-In 1971 Timberlane Lumber Company, an Oregon
partnership importing lumber into the United States, formed two new companies in Honduras in order to secure additional supplies of lumber for its
United States operations. The Bank of America Corp., through its wholly
owned subsidiary, Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association,
had significant financial interests in three Honduran lumber mills, one of
which, Lima Company, was in financial trouble. When Lima dissolved, its
employees, according to Honduran law, had first claim to the company's
assets for back wages and severance pay. Seeing an opportunity to acquire
equipment for its second company, Timberlane purchased the Lima plant
assets from the employees and reactivated the mill in competition with the
other two lumber companies in which the Bank of America was interested.
To quiet title, Timberlane attempted to settle the Bank's claim on Lima's
assets, but the Bank refused and its agent, to whom the claim had been
assigned, went to the Honduran court and obtained embargoes of the property of Timberlane's companies in Honduras, ostensibly to prevent the
diminution in available assets from which the Bank's claim might be
satisfied.' Thereafter, in an action in federal court, Timberlane alleged that
this act and other acts of harassment constituted a conspiracy in restraint of
trade in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 2 and section 73 of
the Wilson Tariff Act, 3 that the acts had a "direct and substantial effect on
United States foreign commerce, and that defendants intended the results of
the conspiracy, including the impact on United States commerce." 4 The
district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
Timberlane appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Timberlane
Lumber Company v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1977).

The Sherman Act 5 condemns all contracts, combinations, and monopolies
in restraint of trade both "among the several States" and "with foreign
nations." 6 One of the most complex questions in the area of antitrust law is
the practical application of the statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction
over activities involving foreign commerce. The extension of United States
law to persons and activities beyond its own territorial boundaries must be
carefully analyzed under the principles of international law to avoid conflicts
1. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 604-05 (9th Cir.
1977).
2.
3.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970).

4.

549 F.2d at 605.

5.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Supp. V 1975).

6. Id. §§ 1 & 2.
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with foreign sovereignties. To do this,
one must distinguish "jurisdictional
'7
power" from "jurisdictional policy."

I. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF JURISDICTION
International law is comprised of basic principles that have evolved over the
passage of time. 8 Under these principles there are four traditionally accepted
theories by which one country may assert subject matter jurisdiction over
activities occurring both within and without its borders. The most widely
recognized theory of jurisdiction is based on territoriality. 9 Under this theory all
acts must be governed by the law of the nation in whicfi they occur, and each
nation has jurisdiction over any acts which occur within its territory.' 0 A second
principle, recognized primarily by civil law countries, is that nations may assert
jurisdiction over the acts of their own citizens, wherever they may be." Two
nations can, accordingly, have subject matter jurisdiction over the same activity. Nations may also assertjurisdiction under the "protective principle"12 theory
over activities that threaten the security of the nation, regardless of where they
occur. The fourth and final traditional basis of jurisdiction is the "universality
principle. 1 3 This principle permits the exercise of jurisdiction over acts of any
nation's citizens which are universally condemned by the civilized world, such as
acts of piracy. However, only nations which share the United States' advocacy of
a competitive economic system will encourage the enforcement of laws prohibiting anticompetitive activities. These activities are therefore not universally
condemned acts. Thus, the universality principle cannot serve as a basis for
the extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws.14
7. K. Brewster, Jr., Antitrust and American Business Abroad 286 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Brewster].
8. See generally J. Rahl, Common Market and American Antitrust 409-16 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Rahl].
9. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Restatement];
see W. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws 34-35 (2d ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as
Fugate]; Haight, InternationalLaw andExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale
L.J. 639 (1954); Metzger, The Restatement ofthe Foreign Relations Law of the United States: Bases
and Conflicts of Jurisdiction,41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 7, 11-18 (1966).
10. This theory is exemplified in the antitrust area by American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347 (1909). The decision inAmerican Bananarestricted the assertion ofjurisdiction to those
activities which occurred in the United States. "[Tihe general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." Id. at 356; see Rahl, supra note 8, at 373.
11. Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944); Restatement, supra note 9, § 30; W.
Bishop, Jr., International Law 343 (1953); see Rahl, supra note 8, at 394.
12. Restatement, supra note 9, § 33; see Rahl, supra note 8, at 398. See also Article 6, Princip!es
of International Law, as adopted by the International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-fifth
Conference of the International Law Association 139 (1974).
13. Restatement, supra note 9, § 34, Reporter's Note 2.
14. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 287; Haight, InternationalLaw and ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale L.J. 639, 651-52 (1954).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

II. THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE
In order to reach the activities of foreigners abroad, yet another basis of
jurisdiction, the "effects doctrine,"' 5 has evolved. The effects doctrine was first
introduced in antitrust law by the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America 16 (Alcoa), in which it was stated that acts
committed by aliens outside of the territorial United States are within the subject
Act "if they were intended to
matter jurisdiction of the courts under the Sherman
'1 7
affect [foreign commerce] and did affect [it].'
Since it was first introduced, the effects doctrine has received a great deal of
criticism for risking " 'conflicts with foreign laws and foreign economic interests
. .. .conflicts that might better be resolved through diplomatic channels.' "18
Indeed, several foreign nations have made formal complaints against its application. ' 9
In spite of the possibility of conflict with foreign nations, the effects doctrine
has been recognized as the law of the United States, 20 and its elements are outlined
in section 18 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law, 2' which requires
15. See Fugate, supra note 9, at 37. For a review of th-. international antitrust cases, see Kintner
& Hallgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign Trade and CommerceVariations on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 343 (1973); SImson,
The Return of American Banana: A Contemporary Perspective on American Antitrust Abroad, 9
J. Int'l L. & Econ. 233 (1974). For applications of the effects doctrine in other areas of the law,
see note 86 infra.
16. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see Brewster, supra note 7, at 72-73.
17. 148 F.2d at 444.
18. Fugate, supra note 9, at 72 (quoting from Hearingson S. Res. 26 Before the Subconmm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 236 (1967)).
19. Objections from foreign governments have most often been made in connection with discovery proceedings in the United States directing production of documents held by corporations based In
foreign nations. See ABA, Antitrust Law Development; 370-73 (1975); Fugate, supra note 9, at
50 n.28; A. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the United States of America 365-72 (1970);
Zwarensteyn, The Foreign Reach of the American Antitrust Laws, 3 Am. Bus. L.J. 163, 167-70
(1965).
20. The effects doctrine of jurisdiction has also been accepted by the European Economic
Community and is used to assert jurisdiction over restrictive acts that have an effect within the
Common Market. Dyestuffs, [1965-1969 Transfer Binderi Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9314, at 8694
(Comm'n 1969).
21. "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort
under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies; (li)
the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems." Restatement, supra
note 9, § 18.
Comment g to § 18 states that it is not necessary that other nations with reasonably developed
legal systems be found to have similar laws in order for it to be found that the United States antitrust
laws are not inconsistent with the principles of justice mentioned in § 18(b)(iv). See generally
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that the effect be "substantial" and that it occur as a"direct and foreseeable result
of the conduct outside the territory." The alleged wrong must therefore be an act,
the direct and foreseeable result of which is a substantial effect upon United
States foreign commerce. There need be no actual intent, however, to violate the
antitrust laws. 22 In fact, a foreigner might violate these laws without fully
2 3
understanding them or, in an extreme case, without even knowing they exist.
24
Since the decision in Alcoa, many commentators have recommended that a
"conflicts of laws" approach be taken in applying the effects test to eliminate
possible friction with foreign nations. 25 With Timberlane, a court has finally
adopted this approach. It is interesting to note that although there were acts
within the territorial United States 26 which might have served as a basis for
jurisdiction under the territorial theory, the court drew on the effects doctrine to
obtain jurisdiction. Apparently the court had recognized the shortcomings of
the effects doctrine as it had hitherto been applied and took advantage of this
opportunity to clarify and restate it.
The district court, in applying the "direct and substantial" test of the Restatement, 27 which had been officially adopted by the International Law Association
in 1974,28 had simply held that "there [was] no direct and substantial effect on
United States foreign commerce," 29 and had dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge Choy, author of the court of appeals' opinion, however, reviewed the
effects doctrine and the variety of standards utilized by different courts and
writers to determine how great an effect is needed to support jurisdiction. In
United States v. General Electric Co., 30 for example, the court had required that
Metzger, The Restatement of the ForeignRelations Law of the United States: Bases and Conflicts of
Jusrisdiction, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 7, 12-18 (1966).
22. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949); see E. Kintner &
M. Joelson, An International Antitrust Primer 27-28 (1974).
23. This position seems to be suggested by E. Kintner & M. Joelson. An International Antitrust
Primer 27-28 (1974), as well as by Fugate, supra note 9, at 48, although there has been no case on
point. Generally, it may be assumed that any corporation so large that its practices would be found to
have an effect on United States foreign commerce would be well aware of the antitrust laws.
24. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
25. See, e.g., Brewster, supra note 7, at 445-56 (suggesting a "jurisdictional rule of reason');
Victor, MultinationalCorporations:Antitrust Extraterritorialityand the Prospectof Immunity, 8 J.
Int'l L. & Econ. 11, 28-29 & n.69 (1973). See generally Rahl, supra note 8. For a discussion of the
implications of a conflicts approach, see Katzenbach, Cotflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal
Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and InternationalLaw, 65 Yale L.J. 1037 (1956).
26. The facis indicated that the conspiracy may have been directed from San Francisco. 549 F.2d
at 615. If so, such activities would constitute acts sufficient to support a finding of jurisdiction under
the territorial theory. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927).
27. Restatement, supra note 9, § 18(b)(ii) & (iii); see note 9 supra.
28. Report of the Fifty-fifth Conference of the International Law Association 139 (1974). The
International Law Association is an association.of lawyers with members from various countries who
meet regularly to discuss areas of concern in the field of international law,
29. 549 F.2d at 601 (quoting from the opinion of the district court).
30. 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
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the effects be direct and substantial, 3 ' whereas a more recent case held that the
effects were sufficient if they were either direct or substantial. 32 Alcoa, on the
other hand, required a finding that the violators had intended to affect and had
actually affected foreign commerce. 33 One commentator has even suggested that
there need not be any effect on commerce as long as the act occurs in the course of
foreign commerce. 34 In addition to this confusion over the proper test for effects,
there was also the difficulty of defining "substantial."
The effects test was not, however, merely ill-defined. Judge Choy pointed out
that the effects test, as hitherto applied by the courts, was "by itself . . .
incomplete," 35 and did not show the proper regard for the sovereignty of other
nations: 36 "[Ilt is evident," he wrote, "that at some point the interests of the
United States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too
strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction. '37 Another approach was clearly called for.
III. THE TRIPARTITE ANALYSIS
In place of the Restatement test, Timberlane has proposed the following
tripartite analysis 38 for all cases involving the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws:
[1] Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of
the United States?
[2] Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman
Act?
[3] As a matter of international comity and fairness,
should the extraterritorial jurisdic39
tion of the United States be asserted to cover it?
A major change in approach suggested by the first two questions of the analysis
is separating the consideration of subject matter jurisdiction from the considera31.

Id. at 891. See also Fugate, supra note 9, at 30; E. Kintner & M. Joelson, An International

Antitrust Primer 26 (1974); Article 5, Principles of International Law, as adopted by the International
Law Association, Report of the Fifty-fifth Conference of the International Law Association 139
(1974).

32. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972).
33. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). See also ABA,
Antitrust Law Developments 360 (1975).
34. Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdictionofthe Amen can AntitrustLaws, 43 Antitrust L.J. 521,
523 (1974).
35. 549 F.2d at 611.
36. Id. at 612.
37. Id. at 609.
38. Mr. Fugate had earlier proposed a similar tripartite analysis of the general question of
jurisdiction. The three considerations were: (1) whether the United States has the power to deal with
acts outside its borders, (2) whether Congress has the power to make laws granting such jurisdiction

under the Constitution, and (3) whether Congress intended that the antitrust laws apply to such acts.
Fugate, supra note 9, at 31.

39.

549 F.2d at 615.
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tion of the existence of a substantive violation of the antitrust laws. 0 These two
issues involve two distinct types of "effects," which, as prior cases have emphasized, require individual treatment.4 1 The type of effect which the first
question is designed to pinpoint is an effect on commerce, the threshold requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. The second question addresses itself to an
effect on competition, the essential substantive element of any antitrust viola2
4

tion.

A. JurisdictionalRequirement
Judge Choy's first question-is there an effect on foreign commerce-is in his
view the sole determinant of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. The
extent, however, to which this effect must be felt to support
jurisdiction has
43
rarely been discussed even in domestic antitrust cases.
Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act 4 4 in domestic cases must be founded upon
some restraint on the flow of interstate commerce; 4 or, where purely local
transactions are involved, the restraint must be shown to substantially affect
interstate commerce. 4 6 Under this latter theory, "the test of jurisdiction is not
that the 'acts complained of affect a business engaged in interstate commerce, but
that the conduct complained of affects the interstate commerce of such busi40. That the court was consciously separating these two questions can be inferred from the
changes made in the Timberlane opinion before it was published. In the slip opinion, the section
dealing with the effects doctrine was entitled Subject MatterJurisdiction,and there was no reference
in the section to the tripartite analysis. In the amended opinion, this section is entitled the ExtraterritorialReach of the United States Antitrust Laws and encompasses not only subject matter
jurisdiction, but also an examination of the effects needed to state a claim and a conflicts approach to
be taken by courts to determine whether jurisdiction should be exercised. The primary purpose of the
amended opinion was to clarify these three parts to the analysis of the case. The change in title from
the slip opinion to the amended opinion emphasizes that the tripartite analysis is not limited to the
issue of subject matter urisdiction. If it were it would not have been necessary to change the name of
the section. Question two is not relevant to the issue of whether jurisdiction exists; it is directed at the
merits of the case. Compare 549 F.2d at 608, 612-13 with Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, N.T. & S.A., Civ. No. 74-2142, at 15, 22-23 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 1976).
41. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp.
92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd on othergroundsper curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972). See also Comment, The Confusing World of InterstateCommerce and Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act, 21 Vill. L. Rev. 721, 724-25 & n.28 (1976).
42. Ocddental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972).
43. ABA, Antitrust Law Developments 360 (1975).
44. It should be noted that jurisdiction under the Clayton Act is limited to acts in the course of
commerce. It does not extend to those which have an effect on commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
45. This is known as the qualitative test for jurisdiction. See J. Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws
and Trade Regulation § 5.01[1], at 5-12 & n.15 (16 Business Organizations 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Von Kalinowski]. See also id. at 5-22 to 63.
46. Thisisthe quantitative test forjurisdiction. See Von Kalinowski,supra note 45, § 5.0111. at
5-14 & n. 16. See also id. at 5-66 to 93.
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ness.' "47 The long line of constitutional cases outlining the power of the federal
government under the interstate commerce clause 48 has greatly eased the burden
of proving that a local act affects interstate commerce. 49 Today almost any
domestic activity can be found to affect interstate commerce with the result that
the domestic jurisdictional requirement of "commerce among the several States"
50
is rarely a problem.

Judge Choy's approach to jurisdiction in foreign commerce cases requiring an
effect on foreign commerce closely resembles that taken in domestic cases involving local acts requiring an effect on interstate commerce. It is therefore possible
to assume that courts will begin to apply the tests for effects on interstate
commerce to determine whether foreign commerce has been affected in a foreign
case. 5 ' If the Timberlane approach to subject matter jurisdiction is followed it is
difficult to envision a foreign act which will not be deemed to have some effect
upon our foreign commerce. Taken by itself, the first part of Timberlane's
tripartite test asserts United States jurisdictional power to a greater extent
than has ever before been suggested.
The first question would further extend jurisdiction over acts which were
intended to affect our foreign commerce, even if they did not actually affect it.
This represents an unprecedented extension of jurisdictional power of the United
States and seemingly reflects a confusion between basic subject matter jurisdiction and the substantive elements of Sherman Act violations. For, in a domestic
case, intent to enter into an agreement in restraint of trade, that is, intent to affect
competition, may be a violation of the Sherman Act regardless of whether the
restrictive act had any actual effect on trade or competition.5 2 However, mere
47. Von Kalinowski, supra note 45, § 5.01[1], at 5-3
48. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
49. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of
Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976); Fugate, upra note 9, at 39; L. Sullivan, Handbook of the
Law of Antitrust 709 (1977).
50. Fugate, supra note 9, at 71; see, e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S.
186 (1954); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfr. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949); Marriott Hotels, Inc. v. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.,
232 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1964). Generally, if a corporation uses the mails, telegraph, or telephone
or purchases raw materials out of state for synthesis in state, it will be found to have sufficient ties
with interstate commerce to be within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States v.
Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954); United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347
U.S. 198, 200 (1954); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 542 (1944).
51. The Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association asserts that "Itihe relevant
antitrust statutes may ... be interpreted as broadly in determining the scope and content of 'foreign
commerce' as they have been in determining the scope and content of 'interstate commerce.' Thus,
the American antitrust statutes regulating foreign commerce may reach all types of activities-industrial, commercial and business-covered by domestic antitrust laws, including export and
import of commodities; direct investments and acquisitions abroad; transportation and communication services; financial activities; and transactions in industrial property rights, such as patents,
know-how, trademarks, and copyrights." ABA, Antitrust Law Developments 359 (1975).
52. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). See also Brewster,
supra note 7, at 64.
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intent to affect interstate commerce that does not approach the state of being an
actual threat, does not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of having a sub53
stantial effect on commerce.
By suggesting that an intent to affect commerce is in itself a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction, Judge Choy may be relying upon the protective principle 54 which
allows a nation to exercise jurisdiction to protect its interests. Under that theory
an intent to injure the United States could possibly support the assertion of
jurisdiction although it seems unlikely that the United States would have to
protect itself from a mere intent to injure commerce. This doctrine would seem
more suited to situations involving actual threats of injury. A company may
intend to affect United States commerce but never engage in sufficient acts to
ever threaten the well-being of the United States to the point that the United
States could justify the assertion of jurisdiction to "protect" itself. The International Law Association has suggested that the protective principle of jurisdiction
in antitrust cases be used under only the most exceptional of circumstances. 55
B. Substantive Requirements
The second question in Judge Choy's three-step analysis--whether there is a
56
violation of the Sherman Act-is clearly directed toward the merits of the case.
It presupposes that the basic requirements of subject matter jurisdiction have
been met and proceeds to ask whether the facts are sufficient to state a claim
under the antitrust laws. S7 In order to state a sufficient claim one must show that
the acts in question have a greater impact on commerce than is required for
jurisdiction. They must be shown to have anticompetitive effects in restraint of
foreign trade. Judge Choy has suggested that to be considered anticompetitive
the acts must result in a "cognizable injury"58 to the plaintiffs. That is, if the act
has not had a sufficient impact on commerce so as to result in some noticeable
injury, it has probably not adversely affected competition. However, he did not
state that there must be actual proof of injury and presumably his suggestion
would not limit the applicability to foreign commerce of the per se rules, which
create an irrebutable presumption that certain activities will result in anticom59
petitive effects.
The opinion itself did not give any guidance for future application of the first
two tests. It merely noted the allegation that the activities of the Bank of America
"were intended to, and did, affect ... the flow of United States foreign commerce," 60 and on that basis found the requisite federal jurisdiction. As to
53. See L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 233, at 710 (1977); Von Kalinowski,
supra note 45, § 5.01[4][a], at 5-93.
54. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
55. Report of the Fifty-fifth Conference of the International Law Association 139 (1974). The
Report does not indicate what such exceptional circumstances might encompass.
56. See note 40 supra.
57. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
58. 549 F.2d at 613.
59. See Fugate, supra note 9, at 14-15, 174-75; L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust
§ 234(a), at 715-16 (1977).
60. 549 F.2d at 615.
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question two, Judge Choy asserted that "the magnitude of the effect alleged...
[was] sufficient to state a claim. '61 In a footnote, however, he did suggest that
those domestic antitrust cases requiring a substantial effect on commerce could
"offer some guidance for determining the degree of restraint necessary to support
a claim for relief in the foreign commerce context as well."' 62 In making this
statement, Judge Choy pointed out that in domestic intrastate cases a" 'substantial' restraint [effect on competition] [was] in any event necessary for the establishment of jurisdiction itself, '63 and cited HospitalBuilding Co. v. Trustees of
Rex Hospital.64 This statement reflects a misreading of the case. In Hospital
Building Company, the Supreme Court stated that in order to find jurisdiction
over wholly local businesses, one must show that "the restraint in question
'substantially and adversely affects interstate commerce.' "65 It is the effect on
commerce which must be substantial; 66 there is no jurisdictional requirement in
domestic cases that the restraint [effect on competition] be substantial as Judge
67
Choy has stated.
Judge Choy asserts that the separation of the jurisdictional and substantive
issues which he proposes in the foreign context is not duplicated in the domestic
area. 68 It may be true that in domestic intrastate cases involving purely local
activities, these issues are not separately analyzed 69 but that does not mean that
they are not separate issues. Both the jurisdictional and substantive issues are
incorporated in the domestic jurisdictional test of "substantially affecting commerce." "Affecting commerce" is the jurisdictional requirement similar to the
first question in Judge Choy's tripartite analysis for foreign cases. "Substantially"
defines the necessary impact on commerce and impliedly measures the degree of
restraint or effect on competition. The greater the restraint, the more substantial
the effect on interstate commerce. In Hospital Building Company, the Court
measured substantiality in terms of the number of dollars and the quantity of
merchandise moving through interstate commerce. 70 Any reduction in the
amount of funds expended in interstate commerce would therefore be considered
61. Id.
62. Id. at 615 n.35.
63. Id.
64. 425 U.S. 738 (1976). The issue of this case was whether the actions allegedly taken by a local
hospital and its officers to prevent the expansion of another local hospital constituted an anticompetitive restraint substantially affecting interstate commerce. The court held that, because an increase In
purchases of supplies from out of state would result from any expansion, any activities restricting
such an expansion would substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 744.
65. Id. at 743 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)).
66. Id. at 739-40.
67. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1957); United States
v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954).
68. 549 F.2d at 615 n.35.
69. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976); United States v.
Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347
U.S. 198 (1954).
70. 425 U.S. at 744. See also United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 187-88
(1954).
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a direct result of the restraint imposed by the anticompetitive activity. Thus,
effects on competition have a direct relationship to effects on commerce.
As a result of this close relationship, the domestic cases requiring a substantial
effect on interstate commerce will be helpful in analyzing Judge Choy's second
question aimed at identifying the restraint which would be sufficient to state a
claim.
C. The Conflicts Approach
To summarize Timberlane'stripartite plan, test one asks whether a court can
assert jurisdiction; test two asks whether a sufficient claim exists. Given these
two tests alone the actual limits of United States jurisdiction would be unpredictable. Test three attempts to remedy the possibility of overextension and the
resultant conflict with foreign nations by examining whether jurisdiction should
be asserted once it has been recognized.
Judge Choy suggests that the word "substantial" as used in the "direct and
substantial" test proposed by the Restatement for foreign commerce cases 7 '
serves a somewhat different purpose than it does in the "substantially affecting
commerce" test for domestic cases. 72 In the "interstate context [he views the
substantial effects test as necessary] to separate the restraints which fall within
the federal ambit under the interstate commerce clause from those which, as
purely intrastate burdens, remain the province of the states."73 Thus, in the
interstate context, federal power is defined by constitutional limits designed to
protect states rights. No such constitutional limitation is present in the foreign
context. However, in the foreign context more complex questions of comity
must be considered in order to protect the interests of other nations. 74 Judge
Choy seems to suggest that in this area substantial effects are required to be
certain that the United States is not asserting jurisdiction over foreign matters
75
without just cause.
The Timberlane opinion attempts to eliminate this problem by applying a
conflicts approach to the question of whether jurisdiction should be exercised
once it has been found. This is not a completely new idea. The direct and
substantial effects test outlined in section 18 of the Restatement 7 6 was always
subject to many of the rules of comity suggested by section 40 of the Restatement. 77 Indeed, the need for some resort to comity has been generally
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
549 F.2d at 612.
Id.
Id. at 611-12.
Id.
See note 21 supra.

77. "Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they
may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by
international law to consider, ingood faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in
the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b)the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose
upon the person,
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recognized. 78 In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand wrote: "[I]t is quite true that we
are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without regard to the
limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers;
limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of

Laws.' "79
Judge Choy suggests that these rules of comity may be overlooked in analyzing
future cases unless they are clearly made a part of each decision. 8 0 By actually
including a detailed examination of the interests of other nations among the
criteria for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, Timberlane has taken a
step to insure that these interests will be not disregarded. In attempting to
balance the competing interests of nations, the opinion sets forth the following
criteria:
[1] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
[2] the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of
business of corporations,
[3] the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance,
[4] the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere,
[5] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
[6] the foreseeability of such effect, and
[71 the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States
as compared with conduct abroad. 8 1

These are not new standards. They have been recommended during the last
two decades by Brewster and others8 2 who have recognized that "taking all
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve
compliance with the rule prescribed by that state." Restatement, supra note 9, § 40.
This section does not cover all the possible situations which might result in conflict with foreign
nations. It only directs that the five enumerated factors be considered when two countries have laws
which require inconsistent conduct. However, there is no responsibility imposed upon a nation to
review these factors where it requires certain conduct and the other nation merely permnits inconsistent conduct. For this reason § 40 is insufficient to meet the needs of today's foreign commerce.
78. While the rules of comity may not have been reviewed as such, they were very often
considered in some form. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
702-08 (1962), in which the Court weighed the interests of the Canadian Government before
determining that the activities were subject to the United States antitrust laws; ABA, Antitrust Law
Developments 369-71 (1975); Fugate, supra note 9, at 51. See also note 87 infra and accompanying
text.
79. 148 F.2d at 443.
80. 549 F.2d at 612.
81. Id. at 614.
82. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 445-46; Rahl, supra note 8, at 409-16; Victor, Multinational
Corporations:Antitrust Extraterritorialityand the Prospectof Immunity, 8 J. of Int'l L. & Econ.
11, 27-28 (1973); Zwarensteyn, The ForeignReach of the American AntitrustLaws, 3 Am. Bus. L.J.
163, 170-71 (1965).
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things into consideration [in applying the old effects doctrine] we were showing a
politically unwise disrespect for the interests and prerogatives of other nations."8 3 In fact, most of the court's criteria were borrowed word for word from
those suggested by Brewster,8 4 and the balance were adapted from section 40 of
the Restatement."5 The court's contribution lies in making these comity
considerations a fundamental step in the analysis of whether jurisdiction should
86
be asserted in an international antitrust case.
The first criterion-assessing the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy-is designed to reduce conflicts by recognizing that the act complained of
may be encouraged or even required by the laws of the foreign nation in which
the act occurred, or that compliance with the United States antitrust laws would
be directly contrary to the laws of the foreign nation. The idea implicit in this
criterion is that businesses should not be forced to violate the laws of their place
87
of business so as to comply with the laws of the United States.
Criteria two and seven focus on the territory where the alleged violations were
committed and the nationality of the violator. As noted earlier,8 8 the presence of
either conduct within the United States or acts of American nationals in foreign
countries could be a sufficient basis in themselves for finding jurisdiction under
the territorial and nationality approaches to jurisdiction. Judge Choy is suggesting, as did Brewster,8 9 that these are factors to be considered before exercising
jurisdiction based on effects. The mere fact that these factors are included among
the criteria set forth in this third part of the tripartite analysis raises the question
as to whether the presence of either of these in a given fact situation, although
providing a basis for the finding of jurisdiction, is, by itself, sufficient to provide
a justification for the exercise of the jurisdiction. Perhaps Judge Choy is suggesting that regardless of the basis on which jurisdiction is alleged, a conflicts
approach with a full consideration of the rules of comity is in order before that
83.

Brewster, supra note 7, at 286.

84. Brewster recommended that the following criteria be considered: "(a) the relative significance
to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad; (b)
the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American consumers or Americans'
business opportunity; (c) the relative seriousness of effects on the United States as compared with
those abroad; (d) the nationality or allegiance of the parties or in the case of business associations,
their corporate location, and the fairness of applying our law to them; (e) the degree of conflict with
foreign laws and policies; and (f) the extent to which conflict can be avoided without serious
impairment of the interests of the United States or the foreign country." Id. at 446.
85.

See note 77 supra.

86. Extraterritorial jurisdiction has also been asserted in the area of securities law. See, e.g.,
Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). It has been suggested that a conflicts
approach be applied in this area as well. See Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States
Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1011-14 (1976).
87. Generally, United States courts will not compel conduct which would violate a law of a
foreign nation. ABA, Antitrust Law Developments 370 (1975). In fact, the opinion in one case was
modified to exempt activities which were either required or prohibited by foreign law. United States
v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1965] Trade Cas. (CCH) 71.352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); see E. Kintner & M. Joelson, An International Antitrust Primer 29-32 (1974).
88. See notes 9 & 11 supra and accompanying text.
89. See note 84 supra.
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jurisdiction is exercised. Perhaps the conflicts approach should not be limited to
the assertion of jurisdiction under the effects doctrine.
Criteria five and six attempt to evaluate the intent to injure American commerce and the foreseeability of such injury. Under Alcoa 90 it was necessary to
find actual intent to injure the foreign commerce of the United States before
jurisdiction could be found. 91 GeneralElectric92 relaxed the intent requirement
ofAlcoa and held that the necessary intent was intent to commit the act, provided
the effects of the act were reasonably foreseeable. 93 The difficulty with the rule
expressed by GeneralElectric was that aliens could conceivably be found to have
violated laws that they did not even know were in existence, as long as the effects
on the United States were a foreseeable result of the conduct. 94 Judge Choy has
included an analysis of intent in these criteria as an important, but not determinative, part of a much more comprehensive analysis than either of those
undertaken by Alcoa and General Electric.
Finally, the third criterion takes a practical approach to the problem of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and recognizes that if there is little chance of enforcing a judgment, it would make little sense to risk a diplomatic conflict with a
foreign nation over the issue of jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Timberlane, with its tripartite approach, has spelled out the steps
necessary to analyze questions of jurisdiction over extraterritorial antitrust violations in an attempt to rectify what was considered to be the ineffectiveness of
prior approaches. 95 However, although Timberlane has set forth the steps to be
taken in such an analysis, it has not made a definitive statement of when
extraterritorial jurisdiction will be exercised. The exercise of that jurisdiction is
still at the discretion 96 of the court and based upon its own analysis of the criteria
in the third step of the test. By weighing the interests of other nations against our
own, the court is attempting to show its deference to the sovereignty of other
nations. However, it is still our courts that are deciding whether our laws should
apply to acts in foreign nations. As Professor Rahl writes:
The idea of balancing "vital national interests" of other nations by a national court is likely
to seem somewhat presumptuous to the foreign state concerned, notwithstanding the
qualifications of the judges. "Self-judging" is not likely to elicit enthusiasm from those
since what is involved falls outside the area of
who are judged to be wrong-especially
97
generally accepted crimes and torts.

As one possible alternative, Professor Rahl has suggested that the United
90.

148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

91.

See note 17 supra and accompanying text.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
would
97.

United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
Id. at 890-91.
See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
Timberlane was a private damage action. It is not clear whether the conflicts of law approach
also apply to government suits. See Rahl, supra nte 8, at 407-08.
Id. at 415-16.
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States submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the
resolution of such disputes. 98 This has never been done in an antitrust case. 99
However, as the number of multinational corporations'" 0 continues to grow and
as foreign nations develop more extensive economic policies similar to those of
the United States, such a practice might become a viable alternative.' 0 '
Elizabeth H. 11'. Fy ,

Securities Exchanges-Second Circuit Halts Expansion of Implied Private
Rights of Action for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules.-The New York
Stock Exchange, as well as other exchanges registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), is required by section 6 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934' (Act) to promulgate and enforce rules which will
ensure that its members adhere to just and equitable principles of trade.
Although the SEC has been given a supervisory function overseeing the
registered exchanges' compliance with this section,2 no private actions for
violations of it are provided by the Act.
Pickard & Company (Pickard), formerly a member of the New York Stock
Exchange, was a Delaware corporation which had registered with the SEC as
a broker-dealer in 1962 and as an investment advisor in 1964. In September
of 1967, an unannounced audit conducted by an independent public accoun98. Id. at 411-13. See also H. Zwarensteyn, Some Aspects of the Extraterritorial Reach of the
American Antitrust Laws 127 (1970).
99. Rahl, supra note 8, at 412.
100. See generally L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 234(b) (1977).
101. However, in the meantime, Mr. Fugate suggests that "other nations are considering the
U.S. practice necessary and logical, for if no nation exercised such jurisdiction, there would be avast
area of unregulated restrictive practices in international trade." Fugate, supra note 9, at 50-51.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (Supp. V 1975). This section provides: "An exchange shall not be
registered as a national securities exchange unless the Commission determines that(5) The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination
with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and
facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the
public interest ....
(6) The rules of the exchange provide that.. . its members and persons associated with its
members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of the provisions of this chapter, the rules
or regulations thereunder, or the rules of the exchange, by expulsion, suspension, limitation of
activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being
associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction." Id.
2. The SEC is given authority under § 19(h) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (Supp. V 1975), to
suspend or revoke the registration of an exchange which fails to comply with or enforce its rules.
The SEC may also, under § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (Supp. V 1975), abrogate or amend the rules
of an exchange.
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tant, as required by a New York Stock Exchange rule, 3 revealed substantial
deficiencies and inaccuracies in Pickard's books and records. As a result, the
Exchange imposed restrictions on Pickard and attempted to put the faltering
firm's books in order. The Exchange's endeavors, however, proved unsuccessful and Pickard was liquidated in early 1968. In the course of the liquidation
proceeding, it was discovered that several of Pickard's officers and employees
were involved in serious wrongdoings, including violations of securities laws
and regulations as well as of several Exchange rules.
Aubrey Lank was appointed receiver for Pickard in April of 1969, and in
that capacity he brought suit against the Exchange on December 17, 1971, in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In
that action he alleged, inter alia, that Pickard suffered substantial losses as a
result of the Exchange's failure to enforce its net capital rule against Pickard,
as it was required to do by section 6 of the Act 4 He alleged that as of October
1966 the Exchange knew or should have known of Pickard's violation of
Exchange rules and that, if the Exchange had complied with its section 6 duty
to enforce Pickard's compliance with those rules, many of the losses suffered
could have been avoided. The Exchange moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that the receiver lacked the capacity to assert a section 6 claim on
behalf of Pickard against the Exchange. This motion was denied by the
district court.5
3.

New York Stock Exchange Rule 418, at the times relevant to the case, provided that

"[e]ach member organization doing any business with other than members and member organizations is required to have an annual audit of its affairs conducted, in accordance with the audit
regulations of the Exchange by independent public accountants at a date to be selected by such
accountants without prior notice to the member organizations, and to have such accountants
prepare an answer to the financial questionnaire of the Exchange based upon such audit." New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., Constitution and Rules (CCH) 2418 (1972). For the current rule
418, see 2 NYSE Guide (CCH)

2418 (1976).

4. At the time the action was brought, the former § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970), read in
pertinent part: "(a) Any exchange may be registered with the Commission as a national securities
exchange under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in this section ....
(b) No registration shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules of the exchange include
provision for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member for conduct or proceeding
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade, and declare that the willful violation of
any provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder shall be considered conduct or
proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principl;s of trade.
(d) If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying for registration is so organized

as to be able to comply with the provisions of this chapter and the rules and regulations
thereunder and that the rules of the exchange are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to
protect investors, the Commission shall cause such exchange to be registered as a national
securities exchange."
5. Lank v. New York Stock Exch., 405 F. Supp. 1031, 1036-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 548
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977). The district court granted the Exchange's motion to dismiss those claims
asserted by Lank on behalf of third parties, including creditors, subordinated lenders, and

stockholders of Pickard. Id. at 1036. It denied the motion only with respect to those damages
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, finding that a cause of action in favor of a member firm of an
exchange against the exchange would not be implied under section 6 of the
Act. Lank v. New York Stock Exchange, 548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977).
The Supreme Court has not considered whether an implied cause of action
exists for a member's failure to comply with, or an exchange's failure to
enforce, a federally mandated stock exchange rule. However, implication of
private rights of action for violations of a given statutory scheme, where the
statute is silent as to liabilities, is not a novel concept. In J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 6 the Supreme Court considered whether a private cause of action
should be implied in favor of a stockholder of a corporation when the
corporation had violated section 14(a) of the Act. 7 That section regulates the
solicitation of proxy material, and does not expressly grant a right of action.
The Court found that the purpose of the section was to prevent authorization
of corporate action by stockholders who were inadequately informed or
deceived by proxy solicitation, 8 and that this specific purpose was part of the
general scheme of the section to ensure the protection of investors. 9 It was
further determined that private enforcement of the proxy rules would provide
"a necessary supplement to [Securities and Exchange] Commission action"' 0
and that, therefore, it was "the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.""II As a
result, a private cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs was implied.
The same general question has been recently discussed by the Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash.' 2 In that case the Supreme Court considered whether it
was proper to imply a private cause of action in favor of a stockholder seeking
damages in a derivative action for violation by corporate directors of a federal
criminal statute regulating political campaign contributions.' 3 Holding that
claimed on behalf of the corporation, including the loss of the proceeds from the sale of Pickard's
seat on the Exchange and the money paid by Pickard as reimbursement to the Special Trust
Fund. Id.
6. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). This section provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, by
the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of
a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to
section 781 of this titie." Id.
8. 377 U.S. at 431.
9. Id. at 432.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 433.
12. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976). While effective, the section made it unlawful "for
any corporation whatever . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
-election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or
a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any

370
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no private right of action should be implied under the statute in question,' 4
the Supreme Court outlined the general criteria which govern such a determination. First, a court considering the question should look to whether or not
the plaintiff was "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted.' ' s Second, it should consider whether there is "any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one." 16 Third, it should determine whether it is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff."' 7 Finally, it should determine whether the cause of action would be
"one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
8
the States.'
Therefore, although only lower federal courts have, to date, implied private
causes of action for violations of stock exchange rules, the Supreme Court has
formulated the basic principles for implying remedies under federal statutes in
general. In Baird v. Franklin,'9 the first case to consider private rights of
action under section 6 of the Act, the Second Circuit was faced with the
question of whether a private right of action should be implied against a stock
exchange in favor of a customer of a member of the exchange for the failure of
the exchange to enforce its own rules against its members, as required by the
section. In that case, plaintiffs sought to hold the New York Stock Exchange
liable for losses incurred by reason of the hypothecation of their securities by
their broker, Richard Whitney & Company (Whitney), a member firm of the
New York Stock Exchange. The plaintiffs alleged that through a series of incidents prior to their actual loss, the Exchange had been put on notice that
Whitney was guilty of unlawful acts and conduct which was inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade in that the company had
20
permitted its indebtedness to exceed the allowable percentage of net capital.
Section 6 requires a registered exchange to promulgate and enforce rules
which will ensure that members conduct their businesses in a manner
consistent with just and equitable principles of trade. 2' t Therefore, according
to the plaintiffs' theory, because the Exchange had failed to enforce its rules
and take disciplinary action against Whitney for its alleged unlawful conduct, the Exchange should be liable to the plaintiffs for the losses suffered
by them.
primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the
foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive
any contribution prohibited by this section." Id. This section has been substantially reenacted as
part of § 321 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (1971).
14. 422 U.S. at 77-78.
15. Id. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (emphasis in
original)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
20. Id. at 242 (Clark, J.,dissenting in part).
21. See note 1 supra for the current version of this requirement.
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The court, speaking through Judge Clark,2 2 concluded that section 6 placed
a duty on the Stock Exchange to enforce the rules and regulations prescribed
by that section. Furthermore, the court concluded that under the section, a
private right of action would exist against the Exchange for its failure to
enforce those rules which it knew or had reasonable cause to suspect were
being violated.2 3 This conclusion was based on the well-established principle
that "members of a class for whose protection a statutory duty is created may
sue for injuries resulting from its breach and ...the common law will supply
a remedy if the statute gives none." '24 Therefore, because it was found that
one of the primary purposes of the Act was to protect the general investing
public, members of the general investing public would be given an implied
cause of action against an exchange when the exchange neglected its section 6
25
duty.

The decision in Baird remained the authoritative decision in the Second
Circuit for many years and withstood at least one attempt to expand it. For
instance, in O'Neill v. Maytag, 26 the Second Circuit acknowledged that Baird
granted a private right of action in favor of a customer of a member firm
against an exchange for the exchange's failure to enforce its rules, but refused
to hold that a stockholder's derivative suit against a listed company based on
27
violation of an exchange rule by the listed company would also be available.
Some twenty-two years after Baird, however, the Second Circuit in one
way expanded Baird'sprivate right of action and in another way restricted it.
In Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,28 the Second Circuit considered
whether a private right of action in favor of a customer of a member firm
would exist against the member firm for the firm's violation of an exchange's
rules promulgated pursuant to section 6. Although the court was willing to
extend the private right of action found to exist in Baird to include an action
against a member for violation of the exchange rules,2 9 the court nevertheless
restricted its Baird opinion and held that, at least in actions against member
firms, only violations of certain rules would give rise to such a private right of
30
action.
22. Judge Clark dissented only on the issue of proximate cause of damages. 141 F.2d at
245-47 (Clark, J., dissenting in part).
23. Id. at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting in part). This is a standard of care which has
subsequently been regarded as essentially one of negligence. In Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F.
Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), Judge Cannella stated that 'a]lthough courts should be careful not
to hold an exchange to too exacting a duty of supervision, claims [under § 6] are to be measured
by what is essentially a negligence standard." Id. at 625. See also Rich v. New York Stock
Exch., 522 F.2d 153, 155 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 373 F. Supp.
140, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
24. 141 F.2d at 245 (Clark, J., dissenting in part).
25. Id. at 244-45 (Clark, J., dissenting in part).
26. 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
27. Id. at 770.
28. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
29. Id. at 182.
30. Id. at 182-83.
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The plaintiffs had alleged simply that certain actions on the part of the
defendaft had not been consistent with just and equitable principles of
trade. 3' Although exchanges are required by section 6 to promulgate rules
which will ensure that such principles are followed, the plaintiffs' allegation
was found to be overbroad. According to the court, Congress could not have
intended to create civil causes of action for violations of all rules adopted
pursuant to the section. 32 A contrary ruling would be at odds with one
Congressional purpose apparent in Section 6-self-regulation of the exchanges
for basic and significant protection of the investing public. 3 3 The court also
noted the fact that the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts under section
27 of the Act 34 did not include any explicit reference to exchange rules but
granted jurisdiction to the courts solely for "suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder. '35 On the other hand, in spite of a lack of an explicit
grant of jurisdiction for rule violations, the court cautioned against denial of a
private right of action for violation of a rule "which provides what amounts to
a substitute for regulation by the SEC itself."'36 Therefore, according to
Colonial, before implying a private right of action for violation of a particular
rule by a member firm "the court must look to the nature of the particular rule
and its place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication
of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion
than
'37
when the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation.
The Colonial court added that the case for an implied private right of
action would be strongest when the particular rule in question imposed a duty
which did not exist at common law. 38 Because of the broad and indefinite
scope of the terms "fair and equitable principles of trade," the court was
concerned with the possibility of a virtually limitless cause of action. 39 Such a
broad cause of action would have the undesirable consequence of stripping
the states of virtually all jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of
exchange rules since section 27 of the Act gives the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction
over all actions brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
40
the Act.
31.
32.

Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 181.

33. Id. Here the court relied on Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), in
which the Supreme Court recognized the importance of self-regulation by the exchanges. Id. at
352-57.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) provides that "tlhe district courts of the United States, and the
United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
35. 358 F.2d at 181-82 (quoting § 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970)).
36. 358 F.2d at 182.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 183.
40. Id.
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There is considerable difference in the approaches taken by the various
circuits in implying private rights of actions for violations of stock exchange
rules. In Butterman v. Walston & Co. ,4, a suit by a customer of a member
firm against an exchange, the Seventh Circuit accepted Baird's conclusions of
law virtually without comment.4 2 However, two years later, in Bultrey v.
MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,43 a suit by a customer against a
broker, it adopted the more restrictive test fashioned by the Second Circuit in
Colonial, while at the same time adding a test which significantly eased
Colonial'srestrictions. In Buttrey, the plaintiff was the trustee in bankruptcy
for Dobich Securities Corporation, a corporation which had engaged in the
sale of securities as a dealer. The complaint alleged that the defendent broker
had granted the bankrupt's request to open a cash account for the purpose of
trading securities as a customer of the defendant, that the defendant knew
that the bankrupt, in its transactions with defendants, was using fraudulently
converted property of various customers of the bankrupt, and that the
defendant thereby violated the "Know Your Customer Rule"' 4 of the New
York Stock Exchange, adopted by the Exchange pursuant to section 6.1 -' The
trustee of the bankrupt was found to have authority to bring suit by virtue of
section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act, 46 which allows a trustee in bankruptcy to
avoid transfers which are fraudulent or voidable by any creditor of the debtor
under any federal or state law. 47 Nevertheless, in determining whether or not
the defendant could be held liable to its customers for a violation of the
"Know Your Customer Rule," the court stated that the plaintiff would first
have to establish that the rule in question provided a substitute for SEC
regulation. 4 8 The court added, however, that "[tihe touchstone for determining whether or not the violation of a particular rule is actionable should
properly depend upon its design 'for the direct protection of investors.' ,,49
Applying these tests, the court held that a violation of the "Know Your
Customer Rule" was not automatically actionable, but it did find that
41. 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
42. Id. at 825.
43. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
44. Id. at 136-37. The "Know Your Customer Rule" of the New York Stock Exchange has
been amended slightly since the court's decision. However, it is substantially the same and
provides: "Every member organization is required through a general partner. (or] a principal
executive officer . . . to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every
cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization and every person holding power
of attorney over any account accepted or carried by such organization.
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the organization,
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly after the completion of
any transaction for the account of or with a customer ....
2 NYSE Guide (CCH) S 2405 (1970)45. 410 F.2d at 137.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 110e (1970).
47. 410 F.2d at 137-40.
48. Id. at 142.
49. Id. (quoting Lowenfels, Implied LiabilitiesBased upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 Colum.
L. Rev. 12, 29 (1966)).
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plaintiff's allegations stated a claim of fraud on the investor's customers and
therefore supported a private right of action.5 0 Although the Seventh Circuit
appeared to adopt the restrictive Colonial test, the addition of the broader
investor protection test significantly weakened the Colonial test's restrictive
rationale."1
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also taken a different
approach. In Utah State University v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,52 the state
university alleged that it had suffered investment losses due to the defendant
member firm's violation of, among other rules, the New York Stock Exchange's "Know Your Customer Rule."' 5 3 The court cited with approval both
the Colonial substitution test and the Buttrey investor protection test as well
as a dictum in a prior Tenth Circuit decision that "in an appropriate case,
violations of exchange rules designed for customer protection might give rise
to a private cause of action . . . . 4 The court limited, however, the scope of
a broker's potential liability for rule violations. It was concerned with the
advantages of self-regulation of the exchanges over the alternative of "more
massive governmental bureaucracy and a detailed and rigid regulation of the
entire securities field.""5 In the court's opinion, the automatic imposition of
liability for violations of rules meeting only the Colonial and Buttrey tests
would impair the system of self-regulation by discouraging the exchanges
from promulgating new regulations, for every new rule would have the
56
potential of creating extensive liability for the exchange and its members.
Adopting the rule of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder," the court concluded that
"something more than mistake or negligence must be shown" before liability
50. 410 F.2d at 143. At least one case, Nelson v. Hernh, 428 F. Supp. 411 (D. Minn. 1977),
has determined that a private right of action would not exist in favor of a customer and against a
broker-dealer for the dealer's violation of the "Know Your Customer Rule." In this case, the court
was convinced that "the rules requiring broker-dealers to closely supervise their accounts and
know the background of their customers must have been enacted primarily for the protection of
the dealers. While a broker-dealer should be concerned for the welfare of the customers as a
matter of ethics, the firm as a matter of economics is concerned first with discouraging actions by
individual representatives that might give rise to legal liability. It also is interested in the ability
of its customers to meet their financial obligations." Id. at 419. Therefore, of course, the court
denied the plaintiffs a private right of action. Id. at 420.
51. The investor protection test, because of its breadth and vagueness, would enable a court
to imply a cause of action for violation of almost all stock exchange rules. However, under the
substitute for SEC regulation test, very few rules would be found to provide regulation not
already provided by SEC regulations. Therefore, under this test, violations of relatively few stock
exchange rules would give rise to an implied cause of action.
52. 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977).
53. Id. at 166; see note 44 supra.
54. 549 F.2d at 168 (quoting Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854, 858 (10th Cir.
1974)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must show
scienter, or intent to deceive, on the part of the defendant in order to recover for securities fraud
under § 10b of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1977), promulgated thereunder.
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for violation of an exchange rule will be imposed,5 8 and upheld the district

court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaints."
In Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.,60 the Second Circuit appeared to move
toward the less restrictive Buttrey public investor test while at the same time
utilizing its Colonial analysis. The Van Germert plaintiffs were holders of
convertible debentures issued by defendant Boeing. The debentures were
listed on the New York Stock Exchange pursuant to a listing agreement
between Boeing and the Exchange. 6 ' The plaintiffs alleged that Boeing had
given inadequate notice of its intention to redeem the convertible debentures,
and that such inadequate notice was in violation of the requirements of the
New York Stock Exchange rules promulgated pursuant to section 6 of the
Act. 62 The plaintiffs claimed to have suffered loss by reason of their inability
63
to exercise their conversion rights prior to the deadline for the redemption.
In deciding whether or not a violation of the exchange notice requirements
would give rise to a colorable claim, the court first cited the Colonial
"substitution for SEC regulation" test, 64 but foremost among its reasons for
granting a private cause of action was its view that the rules were designed
for the protection of the investing public. 65 It specifically stated that
to the American investing public listing on the New York Stock Exchange carries
with it implicit guarantees of trustworthiness. The public generally understands that a
company must meet certain qualifications of financial stability, prestige, and fair
disclosure, in order to be accepted for that listing, which is in turn so helpful to the
sale of the company's securities. Similarly it is held out to the investing public that by
York Stock Exchange the investor will be dealt
dealing in securities listed on the New
66
with fairly and pursuant to law.
Finding that a private right of action was available, the Second Circuit not
only expanded its restrictive substitution test devised in Colonial, but also
extended the private right of action to include an action by a member of the
investing public against a listed company which failed to follow exchange
rules. This would appear to be contrary to its decision in O'Neill v. Maytag,67
discussed above. 68 The O'Neill decision can be distinguished, however,
because the cause of action therein was69in the nature of a stockholder's
derivative suit against a listed company.
The implied causes of action for violation of section 6 were expanded again
58.

549 F.2d at 168.

59.

Id. at 169.

60.
61.
62.
63.

520
Id.
Id.
Id.

64.

Id. at 1380.

65.

Id.

F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975).
at 1374-75.
at 1374-75, 1380.
at 1374.
at 1381.

66. Id.
67.
68.

339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.

69.

520 F.2d at 1380.
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70

in New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Sloan. There the District Court for
the Southern District of New York implied an action in favor of subordinated
lenders and limited partners of a member firm against the New York Stock
Exchange for the Exchange's failure to enforce compliance with its rules by
the member firm. In Sloan the limited partners and subordinated lenders of a
liquidated member firm sought recovery of their lost investment in the
member firm by way of counterclaim against the Exchange. 7 ' They alleged
that the Exchange knew or should have known of the member firm's failure to
meet Exchange net capital requirements and that the Exchange had adopted 72
a
policy of not enforcing its rules with regard to the liquidated member firm.
Although the court agreed with the proposition set forth by the defendant
Exchange that a primary purpose of the Act was to protect public customers,
it refused, nonetheless, to accept the further proposition that the public
customers were Congress' exclusive concern 73 and, therefore,
extended pro74
tection to limited partners and subordinated lenders.
The court relied on the preamble of the Exchange Act 7" and the language of
section 676 to demonstrate that the Act was designed for the larger purpose of
ensuring the secure operation of the market in general, 77 and found therein a
sufficient congressional intention to protect interstate commerce and national
70. 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
71. Id. at 1305.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1308-09.
74. At least one case, Weinberger v. New York Stock Exch., 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), has found a right of action in favor of a limited partner of a member firm against the
Exchange for the Exchange's failure to enforce its rules based upon the contract formerly required
by § 6(a) of the Act as a prerequisite to registration. Id. at 110. The court in this case applied the
congressional intent of § 6, as interpreted in Baird, to the contract to find that the contract was
intended for the benefit of investors and that therefore an investor was a third party beneficiary of
the contract and was entitled to an independent claim for relief upon its breach. Id. at 144.
Former § 6(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(1) (1970), had required an exchange to file, as part of its
registration with the SEC "[a]n agreement ... to comply, and to enforce so far as is within its
powers compliance by its members, with the provisions of this chapter, and any amendment
thereto and any rule or regulation made or to be made thereunder .... " This requirement was
dropped by the amendments to the section enacted by Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §
4, 89 Stat. 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (Supp. V 1975).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970) provides, as a reason for regulating transactions in securities, that
such transactions "are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto . . .
and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulations and control reasonably complete
and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit . . . and to insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions."
76. The court pointed out the broad language contained in former § 6(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
78f(a)(2) (1970), which expressed an intent to protect the "public interest" in general as well as
"investors." Similar language is now found in 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (Supp. V 1975). The court also
pointed to language in former § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1970), which evidenced a congressional
intent to "insure fair dealing." 394 F. Supp. at 1309.
77. 394 F. Supp. at 1309.
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credit, as well as to maintain generally a fair and honest securities market. 78
Also relied on was Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,79 an antitrust case in
which the Supreme Court had allowed the petitioners, who were neither
public customers nor New York Stock Exchange members, to challenge the
manner in which the Exchange had applied its rules to them. The court was
further influenced by Bright v. Philadelphia-Ballimore-WashingtonStock
Exchange s ° wherein the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania implied a private right of action in favor of a member against an
exchange for the exchange's failure to comply with its own rules regulating the
conduct of an election for membership on the exchange's board of governors.81 As a result, the Sloan court concluded that a private right of action
should be accorded to those persons who were intended to be benefited by the
particular rule in question. It determined that
[r]ules made pursuant to §6 are intended not merely to protect public investors (as in
Baird) but to effect the comprehensive scheme of self-regulation envisioned by Congress. Accordingly, members of the Exchange community who are intended to be
benefited by such rules (as in Bright) or who are "swept into the currents of
self-regulation"
(as in Silver) have standing to complain of the manner of their
82
enforcement.
Applying these criteria to the facts of the case, the Sloan court found that
the net capital rules of the Exchange "which relate to the financial soundness
of member firms, are manifestly intended to protect those who entrust their
funds or securities to broker-dealers, and who stand in the kind of relationship to the firm which requires them to rely on its compliance with the
rules. '8 3 On the other hand, the court was unwilling to extend the same
private right of action to general partners of the member firm. 8 4 The general
partners were not viewed as intended beneficiaries of section 6 of the Act since
they were charged with the individual responsibility of complying with the
Exchange rules.8 5 The rationale of the Sloan decision was subsequently
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. ,s6 which
also held that both subordinated lenders and limited partners would be
entitled to bring actions against an exchange for violations of section 6.
Since Baird, then, in which a private right of action was granted to a
customer of a member firm against an exchange for the exchange's failure to
enforce its own rules,8 7 similar rights of action have been granted in the
following situations where the relevant substitution or investor protection
78.

Id.

79.

373 U.S. 341 (1963).

80.
81.

327 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Id. at 500-02.

82.

394 F. Supp. at 1310.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.

Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1314-15.
534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
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tests have been met: to a customer of a member firm against the member firm
for its failure to follow the exchange rules, as in Colonial;88 to an investing
member of the public against a company listed on an exchange for the
company's failure to follow the exchange rules, ts in Van Gemert;8 9 and, most
recently, to subordinated lenders and limited partners of a member firm
against an exchange for the exchange's failure to enforce compliance with its
rules by the member firm, as in Sloan and Hughes. 90 However, when the
Second Circuit subsequently reviewed the related question in Lank v. New
York Stock Exchange,91 of whether or not the member firm itself could have a
cause of action against an exchange for its failure to enforce its rules, the court
backed away from the recent initiatives taken by the Sloan and Hughes
courts. The Lank opinion effectively held that section 6 of the Act was
intended to protect only public investors. 92 It expressly held that a member
firm would never have an action against an exchange for the exchange's
93
failure to enforce its rules against the member firm.
94
The district court, which had found that a cause of action in favor of the
member existed, had relied to a great extent on its prior decision in Sloan,
where it had rejected the general proposition that an exchange's duties under
section 6 ran only to public customers. 9 As discussed above, 96 that decision
had determined that the self-regulatory scheme of section 6 of the Act
required that a private right of action should be granted to those persons who
were intended to be protected by the particular rule in question. In Lank, the
district court found that the same reasoning should control in an action
brought on behalf of a member corporation.9 7 Using the Sloan reasoning,
found to be applicable where the action is asserted by a receiver in liquidation
of a member firm, 98 the lower court in Lank held that "[a] corporation, like
the customers, subordinated lenders and limited partners of a brokerage firm,
is required by its status to rely on those responsible for the management of the
firm to comply with the net capital rule and is therefore entitled to the
Exchange's diligent enforcement." 99
The lower court's characterization of the liquidated member firm as the
corporation, which was entitled to bring an action against the exchange, was
developed by that court in order to distinguish Lank from the holding in
Sloan. In Sloan, the general partners of the member firm, who would
necessarily share personal responsibility for the firm's acts, were not entitled
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 60-69 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 70-86 supra and accompanying text.
548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977).
Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1977).
548 F.2d at 66.
Lank v. New York Stock Exch., 405 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 1036.
See notes 70-85 supra and accompanying text.
405 F. Supp. at 1037.
Id.
Id.
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to -a claim under the Act. Here, however, where the corporation was required
as an entity to rely on its management, the corporation itself was found not to
be culpable.100 As the court noted, the corporation is an entity with "characteristics distinct from those of the general partners in Sloan."''° Moreover,
the ultimate beneficiaries of a recovery by Lank would be "third parties who
02
share[ld] no culpability for Pickard's wrongdoing and ultimate demise."'
The court of appeals, however, rejected the district court's reasoning, and
found nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indicate that a cause of
action should be extended to all those persons who were in a position to rely
on an exchange's enforcement or who stood to suffer injury as a result of a
lack of such enforcement. 1 0 3 The Second Circuit stated simply that "[tlhe
10 4
beneficiary of the 1934 legislation was intended to be the public investor."'
For this proposition it relied on excerpts from the legislative history of the Act
which expressed the congressional intention to ensure that the general public
was protected in its investments. 0 5 The court could find no indication
whatsoever that "members of the exchanges [could be] considered to be within
0 6
the class of public investors Section 6 of the Act was designed to protect."'
Also influencing the court's decision was its view that the interests of the
members of the exchange were often antagonistic to the interests of the public
investors.10 7 Therefore, to require an exchange to enforce its rules with a view
toward protecting the member firms could have the undesirable result,
obviously contrary to the congressional intention in enacting the Act, of
100. Id. at 1039.
101. Id.
102. Id. For a case following the holding of the district court in Lank, see Collins v. PBW
Stock Exch., Inc., 408 F. Supp. 1344 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
103. 548 F.2d at 66.
104. Id. at 65.
105. Id. Specifically, the court relied on a statement made by Senator Fletcher, Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, who introduced an earlier version of the bill
which eventually became the Exchange Act by stating: "The bill just introduced for the
regulation of securities exchanges is one of the series of steps taken and to be taken for the
purpose of bringing safety to the general public in the field of investment and finance ....
"It is in the light of the interests of the general public that the bill was drawn ....
"The purpose of the bill is to insure to the public that the securities exchanges will be fair and
open markets. The bill seeks to protect the American people by requiring brokers on these
exchanges, members of these exchanges, to be wholly disinterested in performing their services
...
" Id. (quoting 78 Cong. Rec. 2264, 2270-71 (1934)).
The court also quoted from the report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce accompanying the Securities Exchange Bill of 1934 as follows: "The bill proceeds on
the theory that the exchanges are public institutions which the public is invited to use..
, and
are not private dubs to be conducted only in accordance with the interests of their members- The
great exchanges of this country upon which millions of dollars of securities are sold are affected
with a public interest in the same degree as any other great utility." Id. at 65 (quoting H.
Rep.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934)).
106. Id. at 65.
107. Id. at 66.
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inducing the exchanges to disregard the interests of the public investors.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that it was Congress' intention to
draw a clear distinction between members of an exchange, whose conduct
was to be regulated for the protection of the investing public, and the
investing public itself. 10 8 The investing public was entitled to assert claims
against an exchange for damages arising out of violations of section 6 while
the members of the exchange were not.' 0 9
Although the Lank decision did not require the court to overrule New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Sloan," 0 which had merely extended a cause of
action to limited partners and subordinated lenders, the decision made clear
the Second Circuit's view that private actions under section 6 of the Act were
available exclusively to public investors. And, indeed, in a subsequent
decision, Arneil v. Ramsey,"'1 the Second Circuit succinctly confirmed its
Lank holding "that Section 6 was intended to protect only public investors
,"112 The Arneil court overruled Sloan without mention of that case. It

....

stated that "those who invest in a member of a securities exchange, whether
as limited partners, subordinated lenders or purchasers of other than its
publicly traded securities, have no claim under Section 6 against the exchange
'
for damages suffered as a result of the exchange's violation of that section. 13
In Lank and Arneil, the Second Circuit has drawn a line against expansion
of private rights of action for violations of stock exchange rules. In so doing,
however, it has created a conflict among the circuit and district courts on the
issue of whether a private right of action for violation of exchange rules can
ever be granted to other than public investors. In the Ninth Circuit, the court
of appeals has indicated in Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 114 as discussed
above," 5 that subordinated lenders and limited partners may bring private
actions for rule violations against an exchange. In the Third Circuit the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Collins v. PBW
Stock Exchange, Inc., 116 adopted the opinion of the lower court in Lank and
held that a receiver in liquidation of a member firm may bring a private
7
action for rule violations against an exchange."
In view of this conflict, it would be appropriate for the Supreme Court to
avail itself of its next opportunity to address the question and resolve the
dispute. Until that time, no one other than a public investor can be certain of
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see notes 70-85 supra and accompanying text.

111.

550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977).

112. Id. at 783.
113. Id. The holdings in Lank and Arneil have since led the District Court of the Eastern
District of New York to conclude that "if a member of a firm cannot sue the Exchange for a
violation of Exchange Rules, a member cannot sue another member of the same firm [for similar
violations]." Halperin v. Edwards, 430 F. Supp. 121, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
114. 534 F.2d 156, 165 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
115. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
116. 408 F. Supp. 1344 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
117. Id. at 1350-51; see notes 97-102 supra and accompanying text.
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his right to recover for losses suffered by reason of rule violations. However,
in view of the Supreme Court's recent trend to restrict private rights of action
for violation of federal securities statutes, I"8 it is not unreasonable to suggest
that the Supreme Court will agree with the Second Circuit and conclude that
only public investors are entitled to bring private actions for rule violations.
Christopher B. Mead
118. This trend has been set by several recent Supreme Court cases. First, the Court held in
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977), that a defeated tender offeror has no
implied cause of action for damages under § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
A related line of cases also indicates the restrictive trend. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court held that under § 10tb) of the Act, is U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1977), promulgated thereunder, which prohibit the
use of manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
private damage actions would be limited to plaintiffs who had actually purchased or sold
securities. Subsequently, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). similar actions
were further limited to plaintiffs who could show scienter, or intent to deceive, on the part of the
defendant. In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the Supreme Court
defined "materiality" of omissions under § 14(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) Under the
announced standard, '[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important ..... Id. at 449 (emphasis added). Although
the case was concerned with § 14, the Supreme Court subsequently remanded, for reconsideration
in light of TSC, a case which was concerned with the materiality of nondisclosed information in
the context of a 10b-5 action. See Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co.. 515 F 2d 591 (5th Cir 1975),
remanded, 426 U.S. 944 (1976) (mem.). And, most recently, in Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v Green,
97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977), the Court held that private damage actions for fraud under § 10b would
not include actions for breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, the word manipulation, as used in § 10(b),
does not encompass unfair treatment of shareholders by a fiduciary. It only refers "generally to
practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead
ld. at 1302.
I..."
investors by artificially affecting market activity .

